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KENNETH L. LASOEN 
For Belgian Eyes Only: Intelligence 
Cooperation in Belgium  
We all think our own secrets are the only ones that matter.                                  
—James Bond in Ian Fleming’s Goldfinger 
The Kingdom of Belgium has two intelligence services. The domestic State 
Security service, the Veiligheid van de Staat–Sûreté de l’Etat (VSSE), was 
established in 1830. A military intelligence service, the Algemene Dienst 
Inlichtingen en Veiligheid–Service Général du Renseignement et de la 
Securité (ADIV/SGRS–ACOS-IS1), was established in 1915 to provide 
intelligence for the military and act as a security service for the Belgian 
Army’s operations. Their output is mainly security intelligence, with a 
focus on the domestic. Both services’ legal remits have been determined by 
the Intelligence Services Act of 1998 and they have been held accountable 
by an oversight committee under the purview of the legislature since 1993.2 
The legislation was the result of an array of disruptive events and scandals 
in the preceding decade, making it apparent that justice and public 
safety were being undermined by a badly functioning security and policing  
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apparatus. Ensuring effective cooperation and the structured exchange of 
information was the crux of the “Pentecost Plan,” an extensive public 
safety and criminal justice reform program expounded by the government 
in 1990.3 
Both services and the Standing Review Committee have since been trying 
to tackle legal and organizational issues surrounding the efforts to establish 
more intensive collaboration and root out the deeply ingrained tendency 
towards entrenchment. Much headway has been made, but stumbling 
blocks remain. In its 2014 coalition agreement, the Belgian government 
made much of improving intelligence cooperation. It expressed the 
intention to fight competition and “stove-piping” between the services and 
attain operational synergy. A National Security Council would be 
established to conduct reform and optimization, informed by a study on 
the intelligence and security services undertaken by the Defence 
Department.4 The government’s policy was, however, blighted by a degree 
of ambivalence: in choosing between security and economy, austerity 
prevailed. The terrorist attacks in Paris of 13 November 2015 finally 
compelled the Belgian government to seriously commit to national 
security. The great damage done to Belgium’s international reputation by 
the Belgian connection to both those attacks and their planning gave rise 
to a number of measures, provoking a rare national debate about the 
country’s security. Unfortunately, Belgium was to itself fall victim to 
terrorist attacks on 22 March 2016 (22/3). Once again, the effectiveness of 
the intelligence and security services was brought to the fore, as was their 
alignment in regard to countering the threats that currently plague 
Western European countries. Under international scrutiny, the viability of 
the nation itself was brought into question by a series of articles in the 
international press. Their sometimes tendentious tenor revealed how little 
Belgium and its security dispositive is understood. The two issues, security 
and intelligence, therefore need to be put in context, especially in light of 
recent events. 
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
The legal framework governing Belgium’s security apparatus is laced with 
the inheritance of traumatic events terrorizing the country in the 1980s, 
events seemingly exacerbated by the profound fragmentation of the 
intelligence, police, and judicial authorities. A long and discreditable 
history of mainly suspicious and disinterested political leadership5 left the 
intelligence and police services entirely to their own devices, pursuing 
their tangible goals without regard for the broader context. Ensuing 
parliamentary inquiries indicted as a main shortcoming this flow of 
parallel currents in a climate of mistrust, animosity, and intransigence.6 
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Putting an end to parochialism and providing a legal framework containing 
the means of accountability were the main recommendations.7 It was 
incumbent upon the government to prevent such thorough fragmentation 
from again metastasizing into calamity. The 1991 law establishing the 
Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee created an oversight 
body to watch over the effectiveness and coordination of the intelligence 
services.8 While the lawmakers pressed home the principle of legitimacy, 
and therefore strict adherence to the legal framework, it would 
nonetheless prove long in coming. 
During the period between the departure of the Standing Committee in 
1993 and the enactment of the 1998 Intelligence Services Act both the 
oversight body and the intelligence services attempted to get their bearings. 
While the act was being drafted, a sort of legal limbo prevailed. The 
Standing Committee began unfolding its activities in accordance with its 
interpretation of its legal mission, whereas the services, plagued by 
uncertainty, instability, and low morale, awaited developments while 
restructuring internally.9 The fact remained that, as organizations, the 
services were still rooted in concealment. In 1994, two VSSE intelligence 
officers were appointed to act as liaison with the ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and the Interior. Their VSSE colleagues were instructed to have no 
contact with them whatsoever; that now had to happen via official 
channels only. The idea behind establishing liaison was thus undermined 
from the start. In fact, a liaison officer was dispatched to the Justice 
ministry no earlier than 2008.10 
From the beginning the Committee noted the existence of informal ad 
hoc contacts among various departments, but no exchanges occurred 
between the analysts of both services. Upon discussing this situation with 
the intelligence chiefs in 1995, the Committee’s magistrates were told the 
services were awaiting the finalization of the law determining their legal 
remit of the intelligence services, before organizing cooperation. Finding 
this unsatisfactory, the Committee suggested preparatory meetings to 
that effect, but was rebuked by the Prime Minister, who cited the 
separation of powers. As an oversight body of the legislature, the 
Committee had no business taking up the coordination of agencies that 
fell under the executive. That initiative lay with the responsible ministers. 
Criticism about the oversight body’s interpretation of its mission was 
also expressed in Parliament. The Committee had to interpret the first 
article of the 1991 law as ensuring cooperation by holding the services 
accountable, but not by itself taking up the coordinating role.11 But no 
effort was made to comply with the law’s desire to establish a systematic 
collaboration. Before long the Standing Committee began referring to a 




British Major-General Kenneth Strong has noted that the “main 
governmental structures of most developed countries include a variety of 
independent agencies or departments concerned one way or another with 
intelligence. The main organizational problem is the extent to which these 
should be under or independent of central direction and control.”13 In its 
first activity report, the Standing Committee noted the desirability of 
having a central organ wherein the execution of the Belgian services’ 
missions could be coordinated. In response to the priorities as outlined by 
the government, it recommended the establishment of an organized 
interdepartmental structure to both conceive and coordinate the tasks of 
the country’s intelligence and security apparatus. The Committee envisaged 
this as happening on two levels: one where the governmental security 
agenda would be translated into concrete goals; the other a forum where 
the intelligence chiefs, the heads of police, and other involved departments 
could meet and ensure the execution of the various missions. A high-level 
civil servant could coordinate the whole undertaking.14 The goal would be 
to not merely ensure effective collaboration between the services, but to 
also facilitate information sharing across the board, to the benefit of any 
government department. Since then, this recommendation remains the 
most long-standing made by the Committee, one it reiterates often in its 
activity reports.15 
Earlier Efforts 
In June 1996 Belgian security policy was endowed with two coordinating 
bodies. At the top-level, intelligence policy and priorities would be 
determined by a Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security, 
chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by the Justice, Defence, and 
Interior ministers. The council’s decisions were to be implemented by the 
College for Intelligence and Security. Chaired by a representative of the 
Prime Minister, the College membership consisted of the intelligence chiefs, 
the head of the police, and the director-general of the Interior Ministry.16 
In principle, this body seemed to be an impressive gathering of key 
policymakers and executives. Yet, among its distinctive features was 
sluggishness and an indeterminacy of focus in setting clear policy 
objectives. The phrase “waiting for instructions from the Ministerial 
Committee” would often recur in explanation of why no action had been 
undertaken in a specific case.17 In 2002, the Standing Committee pointed 
out that the VSSE had still not received directives from the Ministerial 
Committee, four years after this agency’s portfolio had been extended with 
the mission to protect the country’s economic and scientific potential.18 
Similarly, instructions on the procedures for establishing liaison with other 
government departments remained expectant.19 The resolution taken in 
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2004 to convene every last Friday of the month soon proved a notion difficult 
to implement.20 
Some clarity was achieved in 1998 when, after years of preparation, 
Parliament enacted the Intelligence Services Act. It determined the terms 
of reference of both agencies. The Act’s fourth sub-division states: 
§1. The intelligence and security services, the police services, the 
administrative and judicial authorities will see to a mutual cooperation 
that is as effective as possible. The intelligence and security services will 
also ensure collaboration with foreign intelligence and security services.  
§2. When so requested the intelligence and security services can, as 
determined by a protocol approved by the ministers involved, provide 
cooperation and especially technical assistance to the judicial and 
governing authorities.  
§3. The Ministerial Committee determines the … conditions whereby 
intelligence is communicated and the conditions of the cooperation 
intended by §1 of the present article.21 
Anticipating these obligations, the services in 1997 concluded the first of a 
series of cooperation protocols. Still awaiting the enactment of the 1998 law, 
its contents focused on ensuring coordination and cooperation by 
stimulating the exchange of ideas, papers, and information on common 
issues (namely, espionage, terrorism, proliferation, subversive groups, 
information security), as well as the discussion of analyses. The protocol 
also sought to provide a framework for solving jurisdictional issues in case 
of overlapping remits. Notably, ADIV had to share more information with 
VSSE than vice versa, a situation explained by the ADIV’s more limited, 
military sphere. The need for balanced reciprocal obligations was 
nevertheless emphasized in the interest of sustaining the information 
position of the military service.22 
The 1997 protocol determined that every six months a meeting was to be 
held between specialists of the involved departments. In addition, an 
exchange of information and other regular contacts would take place, 
according to necessity and the issues under review. This happened via a 
“pilot service,” which handed the information to the interested parties. The 
services would also interact with other government departments when 
working on espionage, extremism, organized crime, proliferation, 
terrorism, harmful religious sects, or other issues prioritized by the 
government. The Standing Committee in 1998 rendered a very positive 
evaluation of the contacts, with indications of a growing tendency to 
consult one another about common issues.23 The protocol also sought to 
clarify the modalities for the exchange of information when “it is a priori 
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difficult to say if aside from other concerns military interests are also on the 
line.”24 When relevant, or in case of overlap, memoranda were to be shared, 
as, for instance, when VSSE assessed the threat that extremist anti-globalist 
organizations constituted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).25 
But neither service had yet entirely embraced the spirit of the agreement. 
Execution of the protocol was perfunctory.26 Also, those involved were 
confronted with determining what was relevant for exchange and when. 
Then, when they met, they often found there wasn’t that much to talk 
about and therefore experienced the exercise as a waste of time. Similarly, 
the exchange of information proved difficult because of the use of different 
software. Thus, the scorecard of cooperation in these domains has, overall, 
not exactly featured high marks. However, the only performance sources 
are the oversight reports and press stories. Both come with a caveat: 
the Standing Committee’s main function is to highlight deficiencies in the 
system, and the media—mostly relying on anonymous statements and 
hearsay—relishes stories about badly functioning government departments, 
especially when the intelligence services are involved. 
While one field in particular hits the low-point—counterterrorism has been 
the most worrisome—collaboration elsewhere has also been slow on the 
uptake. In the domain of organized crime, cooperation was marked by a 
certain reticence from both sides to engage in a meaningful exchange of 
ideas. As a result, strategic analysis of the phenomenon was entirely 
lacking and contacts were mostly informal, even though the VSSE had 
declared the importance of a crosscutting approach to the problem and 
took a proactive stance to that effect.27 As early as the first cooperation 
protocol, the problem concerning the jurisdiction of monitoring the 
proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons became manifest 
and designated the various personnel that had to be involved.28 By 2008, 
these early agreements had foreseen in the establishment of a firmer 
cooperation platform between the intelligence services. The extensive 
involvement of other involved authorities (CANVEK, Interior, maritime 
security) was by then on track, while other protocols (involving the 
Federal Public Services Economy, and Finance) were being finalized.29 All 
sectors have since deemed the cooperation to be satisfactory and 
contributing to the goal of attaining a general assessment of a problem, 
thereby enabling middle and long-term strategic analysis. Opposed to that 
positive development, however, is the ineffective prevention of the export 
of sensitive products, aborted by the chronic shortage of means and staff, 
and the failed attempts to get a working group with the Customs Office up 
and running.30 The Standing Committee keeps stressing the importance of 
effective cooperation agreements as a remedy.31 
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Keeping the Secrets 
In addressing the topic of the security of information, BELINFOSEC (for 
Belgian Information Security) was established under the auspices of the 
ADIV’s technical security division. An informal group, composed of 
military and civil service, as well as industrial and academic individuals, 
BELINFOSEC dealt with the security of communications systems used for 
transmitting sensitive information.32 But the international dimension 
within Belgium’s security landscape posed difficulties regarding sensitive 
information transfers and their breach. Discovery in 2003 of Israeli-made 
listening devices in the headquarters of the Council of the European Union 
(EU) served to illustrate the jurisdictional issues involved with the presence 
of the international institutions on Belgian soil. Despite being an obvious 
target for foreign intelligence services, no protocol of mutual assistance 
exists between Belgian counterintelligence and the independent security 
service of the European institutions. This poses multiple difficulties, 
especially as espionage incidents within the EU buildings are the 
responsibility of the internal security service, whereas any related incident 
outside those buildings naturally falls under the remit of VSSE. Still, in 
2003 the Council’s security office immediately requested the VSSE’s 
assistance. The Council also pressed charges with the Belgian criminal 
prosecution office, which once again impeded interagency communication, 
even after the VSSE had been asked to act as an expert in the criminal 
investigation. Seven service sections involved in the case worked alongside 
one another without coordination, and the analysis and counterintelligence 
divisions were informed only after the story broke in the press.33 
A scientific espionage case in 1998 evidenced no intelligence service 
collaboration, either before or after the incident, even though the victim 
was known to the ADIV since the agency had occasionally worked for 
Defence, and the VSSE had to investigate the case as part of its new 
mission of protecting the country’s economic and scientific potential. Also, 
criminal investigations did not allow for a connection to be made to the 
phenomenon of economic espionage, thereby excluding any meaningful 
analysis.34 The Standing Committee reiterated the need for intensive 
exchange of information with all authorities involved, as often it found 
this did not occur.35 Grounds for cooperation were obvious since the 
ADIV was gathering expertise to assist in the protection of military 
technology.36 The VSSE did establish informal contacts about the issue 
with its military counterpart (though without an exchange of data), as well 
as with private and public sector enterprises and the civil service—and 
even with foreign sister services. Directives on how information exchange 
was to take place were issued in February 2000.37 Some improvement was 
noticeable in economic espionage cases in 2002, when both services were 
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involved.38 Included in the 2004 cooperation protocol, the ADIV necessarily 
confined itself to incidents with a military dimension, as prescribed by law.39 
Given the link with NCRB proliferation, calls were made to bring the 
analysts working on these two issues together, but this has not yet 
materialized.40 
Recent years have seen better progress. The Belgian Network Information 
Security platform unites the intelligence services and federal departments on 
discourse about information security policy.41 The ADIV and VSSE conjoin 
in analyzing spying software.42 Naturally they keep each other informed 
about the activities of foreign intelligence services on Belgian soil.43 Yet, 
neither service took much initiative pursuant to revelations regarding mass 
data interception, and devoted but one meeting to the issue.44 
The protocol does appear to be effective in ensuring cooperation for 
assessments on Central Africa, an area of interest because of Belgium’s 
colonial ties with the Congo. Both services have had a presence there since 
the Congo was still the private property of King Leopold II.45 The failure 
of intelligence during the Rwandan crisis of 199446 may have played an 
important part in coming up with working arrangements. The information 
position of the Belgian intelligence services in Central Africa is considered 
quite strong and provides a significant contribution to the information of 
the Foreign Ministry.47 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND THREAT ANALYSIS 
Intelligence cooperation to counter terror was institutionalized in 1984 in the 
midst of the violence of the 1980s. The Mixed Anti-Terrorism Group 
(Anti-terroristische Gemengde Groep, AGG), a platform whereon all parties 
involved combined and synthetized their information on extremism and 
terrorism, was one of the first joint anti-terrorism assessment cells.48 
Unfortunately, it conducted its business in a climate of mistrust and was 
soon marginalized. Cooperation by the Belgian services in the field of 
counterterrorism, insofar it can be called that, is a textbook demonstration 
of how “bureaucratic turf battles often act as a barrier to the necessary 
geographic and functional integration that is required to meet the threat of 
international terrorism.”49 
After the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), even as Belgium was taking 
the lead in facilitating cooperation in NATO,50 its two national agencies 
clashed over the monitoring of radicalism in the country. Both services 
occupied themselves with extremist groups whose activities constituted a 
threat within their respective domains. Unavoidably, overlap occurred. But 
instead of seizing this as an opportunity to combine efforts, differences of 
opinion and perception about the nature of the threat caused paralysis, as 
well as questioning by the VSSE of the ADIV’s legal remit in this domain. 
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In 2001, the security service signaled its concern to the Standing Committee, 
in the case of the Islamist extremist group Arab-European League (AEL): 
In its conclusion, the Committee I poses that both VSSE as well as ADIV, 
“each within their legal framework,” have followed the AEL matter to 
satisfaction. The State Security wonders what remit ADIV has in a 
matter that does not pertain to any military aspect at all. She has 
questioned the latter about this without result, i.a. on the occasion of 
various meetings upon the initiative of the State Security with the 
military sister service. The State Security has a heightened concern that 
at times double efforts are made along parallel lines, which nonetheless 
could have negative consequences. In that regard the Minister of 
Justice has sought to consult with his colleague at Defence.51 
In response, the ADIV carefully pointed out that Islamist extremism had 
increasingly been on its radar since 9/11, especially as Belgium hosts such 
high-profile military targets as NATO headquarters. Despite the overlap 
and the need to combine forces to deal with such an acutely challenging 
item on the security agenda, the intelligence services instead nurtured their 
age-old mutual suspicion and chose to quarrel about legal remit.52 The 
cooperation protocol between the services was then seldom applied to 
monitoring radicalism, even if it was linked to terrorism. Terrorist activity 
comprised part of a special taskforce, headed by the police; it was the only 
platform upon which any collaboration took shape,53 even if analyses and 
data were sent through to the AGG.54 The divergence in analysis wasn’t 
necessarily a bad thing, if that could lead to an exchange of ideas and a 
degree of concordance.55 But hardly any sign of an environment conducive 
to healthy discussion emerged where intransigence about remit was present. 
Examples of the lack of communication in this domain abound. In 2002 
seven suspects were convicted of various charges related to terrorism. One 
of them was never followed up on, but an extra dimension was given to 
his case because he claimed to have been whisked away by British 
Intelligence after his sentence had ended, an event about which the Belgian 
services knew nothing. Evidently, information could have been exchanged 
even if the authorities had been queried about this person of obvious 
interest.56 Another example was the affair of the “al-Qaeda couple,” whose 
assets were seized in 2003 because their non-governmental organization 
(NGO) was suspected of channeling money to international terrorism. The 
attention of VSSE and ADIV had been drawn to the couple and their 
organization ever since their arrival in Belgium. When a kindred American 
service asked the ADIV to shadow the couple, the VSSE’s agreement was 
requested. But no exchange of information took place; the VSSE even 
failed to mention that it had conducted earlier surveillance on the pair, in 
2002. The ADIV cited this lack of operational information when the 
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surveillance was blown. While the VSSE considered itself as having fulfilled 
the duties of collaboration within and outside of the anti-terrorism taskforce, 
the ADIV claimed that cooperation was lacking.57 The operation had been 
entirely bungled and provided not hard evidence, but instead public 
outrage when the story broke in the press.58 
Moving toward Cooperation 
While the lack of coordination often became apparent,59 the exchange of data, 
especially with foreign sister services, contributed greatly to success in several 
terrorism dossiers60 and the assessment of security risks posed by refugees with 
ties to terrorist organizations.61 Keeping the previous experience in mind, the 
services concluded a subsequent cooperation protocol in November 2004 
which sought to address the snags in coordination regarding efforts to 
combat extremism and terrorism.62 In 2005, the Ministerial Committee 
issued the “Action Plan Radicalism” after the terrorist attacks in London. 
Both services were tasked with taking proactive, preventive, and repressive 
measures against ideological extremism.63 Upon investigating the efforts 
made in the fight against Islamist extremism, the Standing Committee 
praised the ADIV’s in-depth approach in comparison with that of the 
VSSE. The plan then imposed by the Ministerial Committee markedly 
improved the way the services interacted, mainly by the intensive exchange 
of information and the conduct of joint analyses. From that plan followed 
cooperation protocols with other authorities.64 The implementation of a 
Joint Information Box, which sought to add names of persons of interest 
on whom the services would then focus attention and deliberations, began 
slowly but improved after 2009. The antics of the extremist group 
Sharia4Belgium jump-started increased cooperation.65 
But that was still not good enough. The arrest in Morocco of several 
terrorist suspects, some with Belgian ties, sparked controversy in 2008 in 
which the police and State Security were drawn. When one suspect, 
Abdelkader Belliraj, was identified in the press as a VSSE informant, a 
virtual press war broke loose. Accusations and revelations of rancor 
among the services charged with counterterrorism were reported. Even if 
the press stories needed to be taken with nuance, crippling tensions clearly 
existed. Making relations susceptible to conflict were the extensive 
investigative powers at the disposal of law enforcement. The intelligence 
services legally did not have such capability before special enabling 
legislation was enacted in 2010. As a result, the police, when working on 
counterterrorism matters, had built up a stronger information position—in 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT)—in 
a field that was actually a main VSSE priority. The inevitable overlap, 
which had festered into hostile competition, could be managed only by 
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an agreement that had the potential of replacing polarization with 
collaboration.66 Its necessity was once again made clear when a Belgian 
national of Chechen origin was arrested for a failed terrorist attack in 
Copenhagen in 2010. In retrospect, as it turned out, the ADIV, VSSE, and 
the police had information on the suspect that, if linked together, could 
have led to the conclusion that he was potentially dangerous. But no 
exchange of information occurred because each agency deemed its 
information too fragmentary or circumstantial to share.67 In this case, the 
lack of clear guidelines left too much dependent upon individual judgement. 
When in 2005 details of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
“extraordinary rendition” flights were disclosed, the Ministerial Committee 
ordered the services to cooperate in investigating whether such flights had 
made use of Belgian airfields. As with the action plan on radicalism, the 
Standing Committee was happy to have observed collaboration imposed 
from above. In so doing it also noted the precarious balance involved in 
cooperating with foreign, in this case the American, sister services.68 Since 
then a remarkable innovation has fundamentally transformed intelligence 
sharing across services. A perpetual stumbling block had been dealing with 
information that each service received from a foreign service, under the 
third party rule. This precluded the recipient from sharing the information 
even with its counterpart unless the correspondent consented.69 
A governmental commitment to the integration of threat intelligence led to 
the transformation of the waning AGG into the Coordination Unit for 
Threat Analysis (Coördinatieorgaan voor de Analyse van de Dreiging— 
OCAD) in 2006.70 Staffed by seconded members of the services, the 
OCAD was to generate all-source assessments and determine alert levels, 
as do similar joint assessment bodies in other countries.71 In view of the 
earlier dysfunctions and failure to exchange information, the legislation 
establishing the OCAD sought to reinforce earlier agreements through the 
obligation of providing all relevant intelligence about threats to Belgian 
interests—including intelligence shared by a foreign service under the third 
party rule. Not doing so was made punishable. Considered the trump card 
of the joint assessment process, this legal obligation to share is now the 
envy of kindred services abroad.72 At the same time, this third party rule 
concerned friendly intelligence services, who feared their information 
would be too widely dispersed. As a result Belgium came under a great 
deal of pressure and was even threatened with expulsion from the Berne 
Group.73 Many Belgians,74 symptomatic of their intelligence culture and 
its parochial prejudices, also resisted the implementation of the new body. 
The subsequent provision of an embargo procedure, meaning that some 
intelligence could be seen only by the OCAD director because of its 
sensitive provenance—for instance under the third party rule, or an 
on-going criminal investigation—alleviated the worry of allied services.75 
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Today, shared foreign intelligence is handed over with the notice FOR 
BELGIAN EYES ONLY. It is a remarkable step towards acceptance of 
the idea that ‘“need to know” must be replaced by a “need-to-share” 
culture of integration.76 
The dynamics of the workings of this threat analysis system warrant a 
detailed investigation, especially in light of the events of 22 March 2016, 
and are therefore dealt with elsewhere.77 Suffice it to note here that, in 
light of the earlier dysfunctions, a great number of stumbling blocs had to 
be overcome. The intelligence services viewed OCAD as a competitor and 
were extremely sensitive to its actions. Thus, despite being called a 
coordination organ, OCAD did not in reality coordinate very much.78 
While the connections with its partners reportedly ran satisfactorily,79 the 
anonymous testimony of two officials cited in an investigative book about 
the VSSE was less sanguine: “There was no lack of problems, nor of 
testosterone.”80 Even if in recent years some improvement has occurred, 
turf battles are always lurking around the corner. The organization suffers 
from a great deal of criticism and the sometimes resentful attitude of its 
partners.81 Add to that is the unappreciated task of having to issue 
warnings, and facing the uncomprehending attitudes of the press, public, 
and the supporting services in so doing. In theory, enforced information 
sharing might have positive effects; in practice, institutional egotism 
remains a crippling factor in the Belgian security landscape. 
Nevertheless, the imperatives of national security have brought the services 
closer together. In early 2014 a circular from the Interior ministry ordered the 
creation of a National Task Force and Local Task Forces to unite the 
intelligence and police services toward a structural exchange of 
information and coordination of further collection to counter terrorism.82 
A specific Task Force Syria, in place since 2013, copes with the problem of 
radicalized young people returning from having engaged in—or attempted 
to get into—the fighting in Syria. These persons of interest were the 
subject of coordination meetings where threat assessments were made and 
follow-up discussed. Led by the OCAD, the result was a consistently 
updated list of every name. In theory, this ambitious goal was conceived to 
combine all relevant information,83 but the difficulties of monitoring a 
rapidly increasing number of persons, and the sometimes lackluster 
participation of local personnel, in practice greatly challenged the efforts.84 
More measures were to follow, but they might have come too late. 
THE FULCRUM OF BELGIAN INTELLIGENCE 
The Intelligence Services Act of 1998 is a façade rather than a finished 
building, its execution a mismatch between challenging missions and 
budgetary realities. The vision for an effective and interconnected security 
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apparatus diverges from institutional and financial provisions: no fewer than 
three ministers (Justice, Defence, and Interior) are involved—often 
competing—and the primacy of economic rigor leaves the services 
chronically bereft of resources. A general disinterest for their work lends 
them deaf ears for their plight and without the guidance loosely described 
in the Act’s Article 20 §3. The vaguely worded passage on cooperation did 
not take into account the previous historical evolution and the deeply 
ingrained parochialism of the fragmented system. This omission might 
have been intentional, seeking to represent a clean break with that past, 
but by simply ignoring the issue and including a vague expectation, none 
of that compartmented mentality had disappeared. 
The question soon had to be asked: How was external information sharing 
to be achieved, when it did not even occur internally? A 2002 audit of the 
VSSE revealed compartmentalization to the extent that even the internal 
information circuits barely interacted. The Standing Committee sought to 
“break down the internal walls at the State Security.”85 Even worse, the 
audit and certain incidents indicated the existence of rivaling factions 
within those walls: clans of employees, stuck in the past, considered the 
superimposed cooperation and different way of doing business to be 
merely a dissonant overlaying of new attitudes on a secretive, us-against- 
the-rest Cold War mentality.86 Absurdly, the analysts at headquarters are 
paid less and have lesser benefits than the agents in the field; OCAD 
analysts are also paid better, presenting obvious causes of friction.87 These 
and other shortcomings pose difficulties for the internal flow of 
information, with implications for the external exchange of information.88 
Another audit, in 2009, mentioned that other efforts to improve the 
situation were insufficient.89 The latest administrator-general has adopted 
policy changes towards internal transparency.90 
Information exchange within the ADIV is also impeded by 
compartmentalization.91 Implementation of the Request for Information 
System and other changes are supposed to remedy that.92 Another aspect 
is the failure to record the expertise developed about a problem, posing 
difficulties for the continuity of knowledge.93 But an important initiative 
taken by the services has great potential in both this and the cohesive 
context: training.94 The recently established Belgian Intelligence Academy 
has an important role to play in having intelligence officers become 
attuned to each other’s services. 
Branching out 
In 2011 the Standing Committee signaled that representation in a range of 
international forums on terrorism has occurred in a largely informal and 
unstructured manner. Preliminary deliberations were taking place, but with 
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neither a common process nor any way to determine what position to take 
when representing Belgium, apart from some sporadic fine tuning in the 
College for Intelligence and Security. Likewise, no structures were in place 
to give feedback on the results of the meetings.95 In that regard, questions 
arise concerning political coverage of multilateral intelligence cooperation 
agreements.96 The greatest culprits are once again the policymakers, who 
fail to provide direction or the means to maintain an information flow. 
Service representation within the various cooperation platforms on security 
issues is hampered by the lack of clear directives on how this liaison is to 
function. Without guidelines on what to share, the exchange of 
information is too often left to the discretion of the representative in 
question97—an easy recipe for failure. 
As the ADIV’s security agenda pertains to military matters,98 the domestic 
VSSE has a greater need to cooperate with other civil service authorities. To 
that effect, the service has concluded several protocols in the last ten years,99 
including the installation of a liaison officer at the Immigration Office100 and 
the exchange of information with the Prison Service regarding Islamic 
proselytism.101 Effectively operational ties are in place with the authorities 
involved as is collaboration with foreign sister services against passport 
fraud and human trafficking.102 Various elements are involved with the 
monitoring of harmful sectarian organizations.103 Both services work with 
the ministry of Foreign Affairs to a high degree of mutual satisfaction.104 
The possibility of asking for the assistance of the security service has 
revealed the other side of the coin: requesting cooperation with tasks that 
are not included in another agency’s sphere of activities. The Standing 
Committee noticed such instances in 2006, when the VSSE was asked to 
guard and another to track a suspect, both obvious policing duties. Such 
unnecessary distractions, which usually ended in failure, became highly 
contentious issues.105 
The sum total of issues points to what Michael Herman has called “a 
dearth of means of ironing out potential interdepartmental difficulties.”106 
The legal framework is not always clear-cut, as several cases have 
demonstrated. The strict divide between foreign and domestic, military and 
civil, if there ever was one in this field, has now arguably become entirely 
redundant in dealing with today’s intertwining security challenges. The 
overlap in certain cases presents difficulties to questions that are already 
hard enough to tackle without adding administrative problems. The 
jurisdictional issues between the ADIV and VSSE concerning Islamic 
extremism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) offer examples of 
this Gordian knot. Differences in interpretation should not hijack effective 
cooperation.107 Arguably, the VSSE should not pronounce upon the legal 
remit of its military counterpart, but should instead confine itself to its 
own competences. Time and again such disputes made clear the need for 
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not only coordination but also arbitration when the services are at 
loggerheads. That arbitration capability is lacking, as are vision and 
knowledgeable leadership at the political level. 
Taking Protective Measures 
In 2014, a few weeks after the new government had enunciated its ambitious 
security agenda that would place a premium on security and effective 
intelligence services, it applied an astonishing 10 percent budget cut. 
Regarding questions about the new measures to be implemented, the 
government’s empty answers in Parliament evidenced the lack of 
progress.108 Three wake-up calls drew attention to how this was fraught 
with risk. In January 2015, spurred by the attack on the Paris offices of 
Charlie Hebdo and the indications of a similar danger brewing in Belgian 
territory—prompting a large-scale anti-terror raid in the town of Verviers— 
the government began a search for new funds. But not until the failed attack 
on a Thalys train in the summer did the government announce concrete 
measures.109 The most significant was a confidential circular called the 
FTF (“Foreign Terrorist Fighters”) directive, sent out on 21 August 2015 
to all local authorities. It contained guidelines on monitoring radicalized 
persons by maintaining flash cards on each of them, with relevant data 
from not only the intelligence and police services but also from local 
authorities and social services. As such, the data would allow a case-by- 
case assessment of the actual threat each individual represented and the 
required follow-up. Though largely a duplication of earlier measures, its 
range was extended by the involvement of non-policing authorities and 
their integration in a “local integral security cell” (Lokale integrale 
veiligheidscel, LIVC) to facilitate the exchange of information. However, 
the circular was non-binding and left the initiative to the local mayors. 
Where an LIVC was in operation, the data sharing was often hampered by 
a lack of baseline information requirements, compounded by the unease of 
the involved parties about what information they could reasonably share 
within the bounds of professional secrecy. This and the non-reciprocal 
nature of the data exchange with the OCAD hampered the efforts from 
the start.110 
At the national level, bureaucratic wrangling assured that by 13 November 
2015 nothing had yet materialized in terms of additional funding for the 
hiring of additional personnel for the security services.111 The third 
wake-up call was therefore far more serious and frightening, to the 
detriment of Belgium’s closest neighbor and at the cost of many innocent 
lives. Within hours of the Paris attacks it became clear that the terrorists’ 
base of operations had been a municipality on the outskirts of Brussels, 
Sint-Jans-Molenbeek. That connection turned international attention to 
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Belgium and its intelligence services. How could the indications of an 
obviously carefully planned and coordinated attack have been missed? 
Fingers were quickly pointed at the intelligence and security services, as 
the government sought cover and the world was wondering whether 
Belgium had become a breeding-ground of European terror. A New York 
Times article noted how a list containing the names of the terrorists had 
been sent to the mayor of Molenbeek a month before the attacks. They 
were indeed on the OCAD list, which at that point counted 273 names.112 
But information and awareness, as far as it could be attained, are no good 
when not acted upon.113 
The Pressure Builds 
The country was gravely embarrassed. In Parliament on 19 November, the 
Prime Minister announced a broad packet of measures.114 The city of 
Brussels was put on the highest alert and was in a state of lockdown for 
five days.115 Legislation provided for the setting up of a central database 
of the FTF data so the intelligence could be accessed and updated on a 
realtime basis. In February 2016, the Interior Minister announced the 
database’s readiness and use but noted a delay in legal provisions.116 
Meanwhile, a Joint Investigation Team was set up with the French 
services. Based on information gained from several raids in the environs of 
Brussels, the police were able to arrest the ringleader of the Paris attackers 
and some of his accomplices on 18 March 2016.117 Though the effective 
efforts of the combined French and Belgian services led to a quick and 
much-needed victory, it would prove to be a very short one. 
Four days later, terrorists conducted two coordinated attacks, the first 
in the departure hall of Brussels airport and shortly afterwards on a 
carriage of the metroline (subway) to the European Union quarter of the 
city. Upon identification, the suicide bombers, and a fourth suspect, who 
was apprehended in April, had violent criminal pasts and were known to 
the authorities. Their names had already been flagged in connection to the 
Paris attacks by the JIT—warrants were out for their arrest. At the time 
of writing, a parliamentary enquiry is investigating the information 
disconnects that allowed these men to commit their barbaric acts and take 
the lives of 32 innocent people. Among those disconnects were the faulty 
follow-up on these convicted criminals by the correctional services; the 
failure to communicate the extradition from Turkey in July 2015 of one of 
the bombers; information about the Molenbeek hideout address which 
turned out to have been in possession of the Malines police as early as 
three weeks after the bloodbath in Paris but was not shared; and the 
apparent failure of the FTF initiatives to provide actionable intelligence.118 
A principal question to be answered is whether these failures were due to 
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the inability or the unwillingness of the various services to share relevant 
information. Both cases do make clear the “tendency for intelligence 
indicators of imminent terrorist attack to be often highly fragmented and 
scattered among government agencies and internal compartments.”119 Only 
post factum can the pieces be put together to lead to a quick resolution of 
a criminal investigation. Achieving the opposite is one of the most difficult 
challenges even for the ideal of a perfectly interconnected intelligence 
community. 
A SHAKY FOUNDATION 
Many, if not most, intelligence failures originated in cognitive dysfunction or 
the failure to join scraps of information from across different departments.120 
Belgian history also is full of mysteries, unsolved cases on which every 
department had something somewhere. In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks the realization is slowly dawning that territorialism is no longer 
justified and entirely unacceptable. Threats need to be met with “a degree 
of imagination and innovation which is at odds with the inertia of a large- 
scale organization.”121 Successive governments may have emphasized their 
desire for change, but few have shown sufficient interest, let alone 
commitment, towards actually welding together the intelligence machinery. 
And when they do, they are usually off the mark. The current coalition 
agreement’s passage122 of legislation dealing with stove-piping and 
competition belied the twenty previous years of efforts the services had 
undertaken to cooperate and induce their staffs to accept the inevitable— 
that 21st century security challenges are incompatible with old-style 
contained bureaucracy and cronyism, and that the networked fusion of the 
intelligence product123 is the way forward. Thus, the new government came 
across as uninformed. Its initial lackluster and prevaricating approach to 
implementing the security policy set out in its announced plans was 
ultimately overtaken by events. The national priorities of public safety and 
the financial fallout resulting from the disruption by terrorism have torn 
its economizing policies to shreds. 
In all fairness though, the current government initially had little to go on. 
The painful observation drawn from this study is that the most dysfunctional 
organ has been the Ministerial Committee, in a classic intelligence-policy 
conundrum. Its lack of clear direction, the grindingly slow pace at which 
decisions are reached, and its sporadic meetings have placed a mortgage 
upon the effectiveness of the state’s intelligence and security apparatus.124 
Yet, in the few instances when the Ministerial Committee did project its 
objectives it delivered the unequivocal lesson that the intelligence services 
could work together perfectly, even though the cooperation was 
superimposed. This structural problem at the highest level of government 
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stems from an age-old disinterest in security-related issues. For twenty years 
politicians and lawmakers allowed the oversight committee’s most pertinent 
observations and recommendations to lie fallow in uncurious resignation. 
A complacent executive branch and an equally lackluster legislature,125 
cared little for the persistent dysfunctions. No political points were to be 
gained by working on a remedy. The public’s elected representatives and 
government bureaucrats apparently failed to realize that Belgium could ill 
afford the damage to its international position should a defective security 
machinery result in a seriously harmful event.126 This had to be discovered 
the hard way, unfortunately. Nevertheless, the fact that the country went 
so long without major incidents is testimony to the hard work of the 
intelligence and security services, despite their trouble working in unity. 
Culture also is at the root of the problem. In Belgium, a paradoxical 
criticism of interdepartmental rivalry exists simultaneously with a tendency 
towards organizational seclusion. This conflict is deeply ingrained in the 
mind-set of practically every government employee. Stemming from the 
extended pillarization of Belgian society, and the product of its 
crosscutting cleavages,127 it infuses petty parochialism in every field of 
governance, not just security. The problem might be not so much hostile 
competition, but rather that organizational collaboration rarely occurs in 
anyone’s mind. Staff members who make suggestions in that direction are 
condescendingly discouraged or ostracized in office politics. That this 
typical bureaucratic tendency has for so long been the greatest obstacle to 
effective cooperation anywhere128 is obvious. Even if some of that attitude 
inevitably lingers, the days of fragile cooperation arrangements are at least 
for the intelligence services long gone; and the obstructionists have largely 
retired. Lasting ties have now been established that provide solid ground 
for building greater collaboration and interaction.129 That momentum 
needs to be further increased. 
The question is how it will be done. And it will be asked again in the wake 
of 22/3 and the post-mortem conducted by the Standing Committee and two 
parliamentary inquiries. Earlier, the hope was that the new National Security 
Council would more actively take up its executive role, becoming an actual 
management forum. Some initiatives indicate steps in the right direction: in 
2015 the NSC has taken a number of initiatives towards effective steering, 
such as study groups and long-awaited directives for guidance.130 The 
College has been renamed “Strategic Committee for Intelligence and 
Security” and a “Coordination Committee” was added to it.131 If inspired 
on the British NSC, a National Security Adviser was not installed.132 
The tragic events have sparked a rare debate about Belgium’s national 
security. With the security services still reeling from years of neglect, 
society has been reminded of their place at the forefront of the nation’s 
defense. Yet, their role remains understated: for example, a framework 
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policy document on integrated security, serving as the basis for all other 
security initiatives of the next four years, was approved by the government 
in June 2016, the first time in a decade that such a paper had been 
produced. The 163-page document mentions the intelligence services barely 
six times: one of those specifically mentioned the VSSE, its military 
counterpart is not featured by name.133 The National Security Council has 
lately found itself in the spotlight in the wake of the Islamist attacks and 
the continuously elevated threat level. The future will tell if this new body 
will provide the change and innovation necessary to further mature 
Belgian security policy. 
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